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THE SOVIET NAVY AND OCEAN LAW
Mark W. Janis
Russian naval policy regarding the
law of the sea is in an interesting
dilemma. The Soviet state is a considerable maritime power with a strong navy,
a large merchant marine, and a very
sizable fishing fleet. In order to exploit
these assets to the full, the Russian
Navy supports traditional legal freedoms
of the high seas, so as to give her ships
the greatest access to the world's
oceans. Such support for traditional
laws of the sea puts the Soviet Union
alongside other maritime powers like
the United States and the United Kingdom, all resisting claims of less developed states to greater national jurisdiction in the oceans. But the Soviet
Union is unhappy with a "conservative"
label and wants to disassociate herself
from Western "imperialists." The Russians seek to demonstrate their solidarity with underdeveloped states which

attack great power control of the seas.
Russian naval policy thus attempts to
reconcile support for traditional sea law
with sympathy for the complaints of
the underdeveloped states. This reconciliation is, of course, difficult and not
altogether successful.
An indication of the problems which
Soviet naval ocean policy faces is to be
found in the concluding number of a
series of articles by the commander in
chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral of
the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov. The articles,
entitled "Navies in War and in Peace,"
are published in the Russian Naval
Digest (Morskoy Sbornik) and are an
authoritative expression of Soviet naval
policy meant for Russian naval officers
and those others concerned with Russian maritime strategy. The final installment of "Navies in War and in Peace"
appeared in the February 1973 issue of
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the Naval Digest and was composed of
two subsections, "Some Problems of
Mastering the World Ocean" and "The
Problems of a Modem Navy.',l The first
of these is almost exclusively concerned
with law of the sea questions, while the
second is a general resume of all the
articles in the series and does not
concern us here. "Some Problems of
Mastering the World Ocean" has essentially three themes: that the imperialist
states are responsible for the crisis in
ocean law, that traditional freedoms of
the high seas should be preserved, and
that a powerful international regime for
the high seas is a dangerous proposal.
Admiral Gorshkov argues that the
challenge to traditional freedoms of the
high seas comes from the imperialist
states who seek to divide the resources
of the ocea)ls:
In analyzing the essence of
imperialism, Vladimir Ilich Lenin
pointed out that financial capital,
being afraid of lagging behind in
the furious struggle for the still
underdeveloped part of the world,
is striving to seize as many different expanses of the globe as
possible, assuming that they will
later become a source of raw
materials ...
In recent decades in the era of
the exploitation of the resources
of the World Ocean, an ever increasing struggle has begun between imperialist countries for the
division of it for economic and
military aims, since it is becoming
an immediate objective of their
expansion. 2
One would assume from Gorshkov's
analysis that it is the Western "imperialist" states which have made large claims
to national maritime jurisdictions:
... already today attempts are
being made to usurp individual
areas of it (the World Ocean) by
certain capitalist states and to
divide up spheres of influence in

it. Thus, voices are being heard in
the U.S. Congress calling on
Americans to move to the east
and by 1980 to occupy the Atlantic Ocean bottom to the MidAtlantic ridge, for according to
the authors of these statements,
when it is a question of the ocean
bottom, no one mentions borders:
he who takes is right. A highly
alarming symptom is the practice
of the extension by certain states
of the limits of their territorial sea
up to 200 miles, which is nothing
other than an attempt to seize
great expanses of the ocean. 3
Thus, Gorshkov bends the facts to
demonstrate that Leninist theory explains current world ocean problems.
Since the imperialist states are forced, in
theory, to seize underdeveloped areas of
the globe, it must be the imperialist
states which are mounting the attack on
the freedoms of the high seas by claiming extensive national slices of the seas.
But, in fact, the challenge to the tradi:
tional freedoms of the high seas is being
mounted by the underdeveloped
nations. The first claim to a 200·mile
territorial sea came from Chile in 1947
when that state established her "protection and control ... over all the sea
included between the perimeter formed
by the coast and a mathematical parallel
projected out to sea at a distance of two
hundred marine miles.,,4 In their Santiago "Declaration on the Maritime
Zone" of 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Peru
proclaimed: " ... as a principle of their
international maritime policy that each
of them possesses sole sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the area of sea adjacent
to the coast of its own country and
extending not less than 200 nautical
miles from the said coast.',5
Far from encouraging the 200-mile
claims, the Western maritime powers
have protested vigorously when the
claims have been made. When Chile
made her original 200-mile claim in
1948, the United States responded with
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a protest note, complaining the "principles underlying the Chilean Declaration ... appear to be at variance with
the generally accepted principles of international law.,,6 The continuing
American refusal to accept 200-mile
claims off the west coast of Latin
America is reflected in the conflict
between American tuna boats and
coastal patrols which surfaces regularly
in the daily press. Similarly, the British
Government has resisted greater fishing
zones off of Iceland and may only be
conceding her case now because of
NATO pressure.
The Western states have contributed
to the crisis in ocean law, but not by
making 20Q·mile claims. The beginning
of the challenge to traditional freedoms
of the high seas came with the Truman
Proclamation of 1945, when the United
States claimed jurisdiction over the resources of the Continental Shelf. But
the American claim to the shelf was
echoed by other nations and finally
embodied in the Convention on the
Continental Shelf of 1958, which has
been signed by most of the nations,
including the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union has its own interest in ocean
resources. As Admiral Gorshkov puts it:
The CPSU program calls for not
only the utilization of known
natural resources, but also prospecting for new ones. The World
Ocean is assuming extreme importance in connection with this. The
study of it and utilization of
resources is becoming one of the
greatest state problems aimed at
supporting the economic might of
the Soviet Union. 7
Can the Russian "utilization of resources" be distinguished from the
imperialists' "seizure" of raw materials?
Yes, if you assume that: " ... the imperialist states are no longer restricting
themselves by their own laws on the
exploitation of the natural riches of the
continental shelf: they are striving to
extend their national jurisdictions to the

open waters of seas and oceans located
vast distances from their shores.,,8 But
the real challenge to traditional legal
freedoms of the high seas comes not
from the "imperialist"; rather, it is the
voice of the underdeveloped states
which is demanding national control
over "seas and oceans located vast distances from their shores." As the AsianAfrican Legal Consultative Committee
reported at Colombo in 1971: "Most
delegations felt able to accept twelve
miles as the breadth of the territorial
sea, while supporting, in principle, the
right of a coastal state to claim exclusive
jurisdiction over an adjacent zone for
economic purposes.,,9 This demand for
an economic zone beyond territorial
waters was seconded by the African
States Regional Seminar on the Law of
the Sea at Yaounde'in 1972:
The African states have equally
the right to establish beyond the
territorial sea an economic zone
over which they will have an
exclusive jurisdiction for the purpose of control regulation and
national exploitation of the living
resources of the sea and their
reservation for the primary benefit of their peoples and their
respective economies, and for the
purpose of the prevention and
control of pollution. 10
The motivation for the Santiago
Declaration, the Colombo Declaration,
and the Yaounde' Declaration is the
same. The less developed states want to
reserve ocean resources to themselves,
fearing that the more developed states,
"imperialist" or "socialist" alike, will be
able to use the traditional freedoms of
the high seas to acquire an unduly great
proportion of the sea's fish, oil, and
minerals. Unless the underdeveloped
states restrict the freedoms of the high
seas, the rich states with the most
advanced techniques will be able to
exploit the resources of the oceans most
effectively.
In fact, if not in theory, Gorshkov
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aligns the Soviet Union with the "imperialists" and not with the underdeveloped world. As the article makes
clear, Russian policy is "conservative."
The Soviet Navy is in favor of restricting
greater claims to national jurisdiction:
The key to the 50lution of this
question is the strict establishment of limitations on the
breadths of territorial seas, since a
further extension could create the
danger of an actual division of the
high seas. Such a danger is already
taking shape today, if you consider scientific technical progress
and the modem means and practical capabilities which states
presently have at their disposal.
Based on existing practice and a
sensible unity of interests of the
coastal states and of the principle
of freedom of the high seas, it
would seem completely acceptable to limit the breadth of the
territorial sea to limits of up to 12
miles. 11
As we have seen, even if some non-Latin
American developing countries might
endorse a maximum of 12-mile territorial seas, they are, generally, unwilling
to prohibit the extension of an economic zone which would reserve resources to the coastal state. Such an
economic zone would not only threaten
"imperialist" "seizure" of raw materials
but Russian "utilization" of the same.
Even the extension of territorial seas
to 12 miles poses problems for the
Soviet Union. Key straits, like Gibraltar,
would fall within territorial seas. Accordingly, Gorshkov proposes: ..... in
those straits which connect the open
seas and are used for international
shipping, all transiting ships (and in the
wider straits also passing aircraft) must
be accorded equal freedom of transit
and overflight.,,12 It is not surprising
that, in this matter, the interests of the
two great naval powers should coincide
and that Gorshkov's call for "equal
freedom of transit and overflight"

through straits is matched by President
Nixon's preference for "free transit
through international straits.',13 The
Third World, however, does not generally accept the notion of free transit:
(From the Colombo Declaration)
While all delegations were in
agreement that a strait used for
international navigation should in
times of peace remain free for the
innocent passage of merchant
ships of all countries, subject to
rules and regulations of the riparian states, many delegations
rejected both the "corridor of
high seas" and "free transit" concepts. 14
For a naval power, innocent passage is
less satisfactory than free transit because on an innocent passage submarines must surface and no overflights are
permitted. Some states, including the
Soviet Union, maintain that innocent
passage by warships is only permitted
with notice. Thus, once again, the common maritime interests of the United
States and the Soviet Union find them
linked against the less powerful underdeveloped states.
Gorshkov calls the freedom of the
high seas "the main legal instrument
ensuring the regulation of the mutual
relations between sovereign states whose
interests come into contact with one
another in the international waters of
the World Ocean.',15 How does Soviet
policy attempt to reconcile this freedom
with the demands of the Third World
for a new international maritime order?
First, as seen above, the argument is
made that the real challenge to maritime
order is not a challenge from the underdeveloped states but from the "imperialist" states. This argument fails to
properly account for the realities of the
situation. Second, Gorshkov contends
that Third World states are mistaken in
promoting a revision of the law of the
sea:
There are also statements even
against freedom of the high seas

613
on the ground that this principle
is outmoded and is being used by
the imperialists to the detriment
of the interests of the developing
countries. Our position on this
question is very clear. The imperialists' violation of the legal
norms attests not to the insufficient effectiveness of these
norms, but rather to the strengthened aggressiveness of imperialism
itself, which is stressed in the
decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress. Therefore, it is not the
norms themselves which must be
changed, but first of all cooperation must be achieved between
peace-loving forces in order to
force the imperialist to strictly
observe existing regulations. 16
But existing regulations mean that
modern fishing fleets, American, Japanese or Russian, can fish within the
200·mile limits which several Third
World countries demand. Existing regulations mean that any nation can sail its
naval fleets within close proximity to
Third World coasts. Accordingly, many
underdeveloped countries are insisting
that existing regulations be changed. As
the Latin American countries declared
at Montevideo in 1970: "The right to
establish the limits of their maritime
sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with their geographical and geological characteristics and with the factors governing the existence of marine
resources and the need for their rational
utilization (is a basic principle of the
Law of the Sea). ,,17
As an alternative to either maintaining the embattled traditional freedoms
of. the high sea or permitting national
claims to carve the oceans into national
lakes, the United States, among others,
has proposed the establishment of an
international ocean regime. The character of the American proposal was outlined in an important Presidential announcement in 1970:

Therefore, I am today proposing
that all nations adopt as soon as
possible a treaty under which they
would renounce all national
claims over the natural resources
of the sea-bed beyond the point
where the high seas reach a depth
of 200 metres (218.8 yards), and
would agree to regard these resources as the common heritage of
mankind. The treaty should establish an international regime for
the exploitation of sea-bed resources beyond this limit. The
regime should provide for the
collection of substantial mineral
resources to be used for international community purposes, particularly economic assistance to
developing countries. It should
also establish general rules to prevent unreasonable interference
with other uses of the ocean, to
protect the ocean from pollution,
to assure the integrity of the
investment necessary for such exploitation and to provide for
peaceful and compulsory settlement of disputes. 18
The idea of an international regime
has generally been endorsed by Third
World states. For example, it received
the support of the Third Conference of
Heads of State or Government of NonAligned Countries in Lusaka in 1970:
... an international regime, including appropriate international
machinery to give effect to its
promises should be established by
an international treaty. The regime should provide for the orderly development and rational
management of the area and its
resources and ensure the equitable
sharing by the international community in the benefits derived
therefrom. It should also make
adequate provisions to minimize
fluctuation of prices of land
minerals and raw materials that
may result from such activity. 1 9
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But Admiral Gorshj:(ov feels that
proposals for an international ocean
regime are unwise:
Several developing countries are
steadily advancing the idea of
developing a convention on the
seabed regime and on creating an
international organ with very extensive powers which would become, essentially, a supranational
organ and would control all exploitation of the seabed conducted by different countries. It is
quite evident that such an approach is not very realistic, since
it actually envisions an institution
of some sort of international consortium in which inevitably, due
to the objective laws of the capitalists' market, the largest imperialist monopolies would play
the major role. Therefore, regardless of the good intention of the
authors of this idea, the power in
it would belong to precisely those
forces against whom the creation
of such an organ is intended to
protect.2°
Thus, Soviet naval policy, as reflected in Admiral Gorshkov's article,
appears unable to satisfactorily resolve
the dilemma of supporting the freedoms
of the high seas while satisfying the
demands of the underdeveloped world
for a greater share of ocean resources.
Gorshkov's argument attempts the
reconciliation by pretending that the
real challenge to the traditional law of
the sea is being mounted by the "imperialist" states. Seemingly, then, the
Soviet Union can both support the
traditional rules and take an antiimperialist stand. But the facts belie the
Gorshkov approach because the imperialist states are supporting, not attacking, the traditional rules. It is in
American interests, as it is in Soviet
interests, to ~eep territorial waters narrow and permit free transit through
straits. In this fashion we both protect
the maneuverability of our naval fleets

and leave the oceans open to our economic use. The challenge to traditional
rules of international sea law comes
from the underdeveloped states which,
naturally, prefer to protect a share of
ocean resources through the exercise of
sovereignty because they do not have
the technological wherewithal to exploit
them in an ocean free-for-all and which
stand to gain little from greater mobility
for great power navies.
In defending the existing maritime
system, the Soviet Union finds itself in a
theoretical predicament. The Russians
are now aligned with the "imperialist"
powers, resisting the attempt of the
Third World to rewrite ocean law in
favor of developing states. The United
States has moved somewhat over toward
the demands of the Third World by
offering to trade an international regime
with control and/or proceeds from
ocean exploitation for narrow territorial
seas and free transit through straits.
Fearing that an international regime
would be in the control of the "imperialists" or, perhaps, because actual
control might lie with the developing
states, the Soviet position, as stated by
Gorshkov, is to oppose a powerful
international ocean regime. Instead, the
Soviet Union insists that "existing regulations" should be more conscientiously
obeyed. But an international regime
which would donate proceeds to the
needs of the developing states is more to
the benefit of the Third World than an
"improved" status quo because the
underdeveloped states cannot hope to
effectively compete with the exploiting
technology of the developed states. Accordingly, the Third World supports
either an extension of national jurisdiction or an international regime or some
combination of the two. Neither alternative is fully acceptable to Admiral
Gorshkov.
Ironically, then, Gorshkov finds himself in a more "conservative" position
than the United States. While both
superpowers favor maximum mobility
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for their fleets, the United States is
willing to trade this mobility for an
international regime. Gorshkov seems
unwilling to accept the regime alterna·
tive. Despite Soviet protestations and
frustrations, the Soviet Navy is committed to traditional freedoms of the

high seas for reasons befitting a maritime power; it is little served by a
radical change in the status quo. As a
consequence, Admiral Gorshkov finds
himself opposed to the demands of the
Third World bloc, no matter how much
he doth protest.
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